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Abstract 
The Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) negotiations were a key area in the 
Doha development round, which was suspended indefinitely in July 2006. In this pa-
per, we model and estimate the economic effects on the world and Danish economies 
of some of the more important proposals that will likely re-emerge in some form in 
the near future. We used the GTAP computable general-equilibrium model and data-
base to simulate trade shock scenarios that mimic WTO’s “August 2004 NAMA 
Framework”, which proposed a series of tariff reductions based on using the Swiss 
formula and flexibility rules for specific groups of countries. We illuminate the eco-
nomic impacts of the proposed NAMA tariff reductions, with and without the develop-
ing country flexibility rule.  
Our results suggest modest NAMA-induced effects: relatively small average tariff re-
ductions that in turn increase global trade by about 1 percent and global welfare by 
just over 9 billion US$.  Trade would expand for most observed sectors, but vary 
across the sectors, with particularly high gains realised for the textile and clothing 
sectors. A number of Asian countries would particularly benefit from the NAMA tariff 
reductions. 
The NAMA tariff reductions with flexibility would generate modest increases in Dan-
ish trade and produce a slight improvement in the trade balance. They would also 
shift Danish trade patterns from EU and EFTA markets towards other world markets.  
The removal of the developing country flexibility rule would increase global welfare 
by 26 percent, with the largest gains occurring in the Asian countries. The removal of 
the flexibility rule has virtually no impact on Danish welfare. 
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Introduction 
The Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) negotiations have been considered a 
key area in the Doha development round. The round was launched in 2001, and pro-
gressed slowly and fitfully until July 2006, when the round was suspended for the 
time being.  This does not diminish the importance of analysing economic impacts of 
the major pre-collapse proposals, insofar as these proposals will likely re-emerge in 
some form in the near future. As a result, we proceed here to model the economic ef-
fects on the world and Danish economies of some of the more important proposals 
that emerged before the suspension. More specifically, we take the well-known 
GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) computable general equilibrium model, and 
incorporate a pair of simulated trade shocks that mimic a possible outcome of the 
Doha development round following the guidelines found in WTO’s (World Trade Or-
ganization)“August 2004 NAMA Framework” (WTO 2004) and the outcome of the 
negotiating group on market access – Towards NAMA Modalities (WTO 2006a).  
 
In the proposal (framework), WTO member countries are classified into six groups, 
each with different commitments to reduce bound tariffs based on the uses of the 
Swiss formula. Least developed countries are exempt from making any reduction 
commitments, while developing countries have the possibility to use the so called 
“flexibility rules” to exempt a number of tariff lines from reduction commitments. 
The developed countries have to reduce all their bound tariffs with no possibility of 
exemption. 
 
In this paper we focus on illuminating the economic impacts of a possible WTO 
NAMA tariff reductions scenario, with and without the developing country flexibility 
rule.  We note that this study focuses only on the economic impacts of the NAMA tar-
iff reductions, and does not include liberalisation of agricultural and services sector 
barriers implied/proposed by WTO round efforts. Secondly, the model used in this 
analysis is a comparative static model and does not include dynamic gains from in-
creased trade in the analysis. 
 
We find that on average the NAMA reform produces relatively small reductions in 
tariffs. Least developed countries are exempt from making any reductions, and we 
find that many developing countries (the so-called paragraph 6 and small vulnerable 
economies) can implement their NAMA commitments in such a way that reductions 
in applied tariffs are altogether avoided. As for all other countries, with the notable 
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exception of India, non-agricultural tariffs are on average already fairly low (single 
digits). 
 
The reduction of NAMA tariffs is found to modestly increase global trade by about 1 
percent and global welfare by just over 9 billion US$ when the developing countries 
use the flexibility rule to exempt up to 5 percent of their tariff lines.  And while trade 
expands for most observed sectors, there is variation in such increases across sectors, 
with particularly high gains realised for the textile and wearing apparel sectors.  A 
number of Asian countries particularly benefit from the NAMA reductions. The abol-
ishment of the flexibility is found to increase global welfare by 26 percent to nearly 
12 billion US$ with Asian countries clearly gaining most from increasing market ac-
cess. 
 
The NAMA tariff reductions with flexibility are expected to generate modest in-
creases in Danish trade: 53 million US$ in exports; 34 million US$ in imports; pro-
ducing a slight improvement in the trade balance of 19 million US$.  The reductions 
are expected to increase Danish welfare by 30 million US$.  Of interest is that the 
NAMA reductions are expected to shift Danish trade patterns from EU and EFTA 
markets towards other world markets.  Readers should note, however, that despite the 
net gains to Denmark from the NAMA reductions, some winner and loser industries 
are expected to emerge.  Danish transport services are likely to benefit while Danish 
exports of motor vehicles and parts may show slight reductions. The removal of the 
developing country flexibility rule has virtually no impact on Danish welfare. 
 
Four sections follow this introduction. The first is a discussion of the model, and the 
data and databases employed. In the second section, we fully discuss the employed 
database of applied and bound tariffs. Third we define the two simulated NAMA sce-
narios, including: precise definitions of the two scenarios; a discussion of the Swiss 
formula concept; definition of the relevant country groups; a short summary of tech-
nical aspects of scenario implementation; and a summary on alternative methods of 
calculating reductions in bound tariffs and on rules of developing country flexibility.  
Fourth, we provide two sets of simulation results: the economic impacts of the two 
simulations on the world economy and on the Danish economy which is followed by 
a conclusion. 
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Model and Data 
The analysis undertaken in this paper is based upon the GTAP model (Hertel, 1997) 
and database (Dimaranan et al, 2005). The database is the most recent Version 6 with 
the base year 2001. The 2001 tariff data is from the Market Access Maps (MAcMap) 
contributed by the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Information Internationales 
(CEPII) and the standard GTAP model used is version 6.2 (Bouet, et. al. 2005). 
 
Model Description 
The GTAP model is a standard multi-regional, static computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model. Like any other applied economic model, it is based on assumptions 
concerning both the theoretical structure as well as the specific parameters and data 
used. The model’s regional production is generated by a constant return to scale tech-
nology in a perfectly competitive environment, and private demand is characterised 
by a non-homothetic3 demand system (a Constant Difference Elasticity function).4 
The foreign trade structure reflects the Armington assumption implying imperfect 
substitutability between domestic and foreign goods. 
 
The model uses a neoclassical macroeconomic closure, where investments are en-
dogenous and adjust to accommodate any changes in savings. This approach is 
adopted at the global level and investments are then allocated across regions to equal-
ise the marginal rate of return in all regions. While global investments and savings 
equalise, this does not hold at the regional level, where the trade balance is endoge-
nously determined as the difference between regional savings and regional invest-
ments. This is valid as the regional savings enter the regional utility function (repre-
senting the value of future consumption). The quantity of endowments (land, labour 
and capital) in each region is fixed exogenously in the model. In the case of the labour 
market, this means that the simulated policy changes occur at full employment where 
the wage rates and sectoral employment may vary but not the total number of people 
employed. Finally, the numeraire used in the model is a price index of the global en-
dowment index. 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Non-homothetic means that the relative composition of demand is allowed to change with changes 
in income. For instance, consumers may use a smaller share of their income on food as they grow 
richer. 
4 Hence, the present analysis abstracts from features such as imperfect competition and increasing 
returns to scale, which may, however, be important in certain sectors. 
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Database 
The global database used in this study is version 6 of the GTAP database with the 
base year 2001. The database combines detailed bilateral trade, transport and protec-
tion data characterising economic linkages among regions, together with individual 
country input-output databases which account for intersectoral linkages within re-
gions. The database contains 87 regions and 57 sectors which are aggregated to 45 
regions and 19 sectors in order to keep the model within computational limits and fo-
cused on NAMA sectors. 
 
The applied ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) tariff data found in the standard GTAP 
version 6 database originates from the Market Access Maps (MacMap) database, 
which is compiled from UNCTAD TRAINS data, country notifications to the WTO, 
AMAD, and from national customs information. 
 
The MacMap database contains bound, MFN and bilateral applied tariff rates (both 
specific and ad valorem) at the 6-digit Harmonised Systems (HS6) level.5 The 
MAcMap tariff data is aggregated to GTAP concordance using trade weights com-
piled from the COMTRADE database. 
                                                 
5 The HS6 nomenclature is an international standard for classifying products into aggregated prod-
uct groups. The classification scheme contains about 5000 product groups, is maintained by the 
World Customs Organization (WCO) and is used for specifying tariff schedules.  
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The MAcMap database: Binding overhang 
 
Tariffs: Bound, Most Favoured Nations (MFN) and Applied rates 
Before proceeding, we clarify some of the technical definitions related to NAMA tar-
iff reductions. In trade policy analysis we operate with three types of tariffs: bound, 
Most Favoured Nations (MFN) and applied tariff rates. Applied rates are the tariffs 
attached to every single trade flow between two countries, whether or not one or both 
countries are WTO members. Applied rates affect trade flows directly, and in terms of 
trade policy modelling we implement scenarios by changing (“shocking”) the value of 
applied tariffs.  
 
In contrast, bound and MFN rates are instruments used by the WTO to establish rules 
governing the design of applied tariff schedules of member countries. Thus, they are 
only relevant for trade flows between WTO members. The MFN tariff schedule speci-
fies a single tariff per tariff line (i.e. product group). According to WTO’s Most Fa-
voured Nations principle, applied rates may be lower but never higher than the MFN 
rate. Typically, applied rates on imports from certain countries are lower than the 
MFN rate due to bilateral free trade agreements, customs unions, or preferential con-
cessions. For instance, if Denmark’s MFN rate for a tariff line (say “canned pears”) is 
10 percent, applied rates faced by different exporters into Denmark may never be 
higher than 10 percent. However, Denmark can specify an applied tariff of 0 percent 
for trade flows originating from other EU members. As a result, the average applied 
rate is always equal to or less than the MFN rate. 
 
Bound rates are used in WTO negotiations to reflect commitments of partners to an 
agreement. A tariff line is said to be bound at a specified level, implying that the cor-
responding MFN rate (and hence applied rates) may never be higher than this level. 
Moreover, binding a tariff line means that this tariff rate ceiling can never be raised, 
even in subsequent negotiation rounds. However, not all tariff lines are bound, and 
some countries, particularly developing countries, still have a large part of their tariff 
lines unbound. One of the outcomes of a Doha round will be to bind all (or most) tar-
iff lines for all but the least developed countries (the NAMA binding commitments 
are discussed below). 
 
Changes in applied rates 
The economic consequences of the NAMA trade reform depend on how much the re-
ductions in the bound rate actually affect the applied rates. Only when applied rates 
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hit the ceiling created by the negotiated bound rates will the reform have any effect. 
Often countries specify applied rates which are lower than the bound rates because of 
free trade agreements, preferential rates, or simply because the MFN rate is lower 
than the bound rate. This is typically referred to as the binding overhang, or “water” 
in the tariffs. To illustrate this binding overhang and how much applied rates change 
with the NAMA reform, tables 1a, 1b, and 1c below present averages of (total) bound 
and applied tariffs before and after the proposed reform, calculated on the basis of the 
MAcMap database. 
 
Comparisons of bound and applied tariffs before and after a Doha reduction in bound 
tariffs vary noticeably depending on how averages are calculated -- each tells a differ-
ent story: 
 
• as trade-weighted averages with applied rates based on bilateral preferential 
rates (table 1a). 
• as trade-weighted averages with applied rates based on MFN, not bilateral 
rates (table 1b). 
• and as simple averages (see table 1c). 
 
The first column in table 1a compares bound rates with applied rates for each country 
indicating the average binding overhang of the tariff schedules. When the gap be-
tween the bound and applied rate is wide, a large cut in the bound rate is needed to 
produce a given reduction in the applied rate. The second column shows the outcome 
of the Doha trade round as analysed in this paper.6 For developing countries, the sec-
ond column also presents the outcome of an alternative Doha round with no flexibility 
allowed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Recall again that small vulnerable and paragraph 6 economies are able to formulate binding sched-
ules that avoid reductions in applied rates and we do not implement formula cuts for these countries. 
Similarly, LDCs are exempt from making any reduction commitments. 
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Table 1.a. NAMA trade weighted averages of bound and bilateral applied AVE tar-
iffs, percent. 
 
 Pre Doha AVE ------------- Post Doha AVE --------------
Bound Applied Bound Applied Bound Applied
 
Developed countries 
EU25 3.1 1.7 1.8 1.1   
Norway 2.8 0.1 1.5 0.1   
Switzerland 4.0 0.1 2.4 0.1   
Other EFTA 12.4 2.6 4.2 1.5   
USA 2.6 1.6 1.5 0.9   
Canada 4.8 0.8 2.7 0.5   
Japan 4.2 1.3 1.9 0.8   
Australia 10.4 4.5 3.9 3.0   
New Zealand 11.8 2.2 4.1 2.1   
 
Developing Countries -- Flexibility -- - No flexibility -
China 6.0 5.8 4.0 4.0 3.5 3.4
India 35.7 25.9 11.7 10.1 10.7 9.1
Brazil 30.1 10.2 10.9 7.7 9.8 6.9
Other Developing Countries 18.1 3.7 7.7 2.8 7.0 2.5
  
Small Vulnerable Economies 30.7 7.0     
Paragraph 6 countries 39.5 12.8     
Least Developed Countries 43.4 12.7     
 
Source: MacMapHS6 database and own calculations 
Note: Both pre-Doha and post-Doha figures use pre-simulation trade as weights. Thus, post-Doha averages 
do not reflect any change in trade patterns as a result of the simulation.  
 
 
Applied rates based on bilateral rates. The average applied tariff covers all bilateral 
trade flows, including those characterised by Free Trade Agreements and preferential 
rates, but excluding intra-EU trade. The figures show the average tariff actually ap-
plied to the imports coming into the country. The table therefore shows how much 
applied tariff rates change by implementing the Doha agreement and would give an 
indication of expected impacts on trade. For example, the average pre-Doha bound 
rate for New Zealand is 11.8 percent with an average applied rate of just 2.2 percent 
suggesting a considerable binding overhang. After the trade reform, the average 
bound rate has been reduced to 4.1 percent resulting in very small a reduction in ap-
plied rates to 2.7 percent. Hence, because of the large binding overhang even a 65% 
reduction in the average bound tariff produces a less than 5% decline in average ap-
plied tariffs. 
 
With the notable exception of India, average applied tariffs are already fairly low and 
trade reform will not result in large tariff reductions. However, India’s specific cut in 
applied tariffs from an average of 26 percent to 10.1 percent (9.1 percent without 
flexibility) is expected to produce considerable change in relevant trade patterns. Al-
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lowing flexibility for developing countries produces smaller cuts in tariffs. On aver-
age, the difference in outcome of the two scenarios is not large. However, at the sec-
toral level the issue of flexibility may very well be significant. 
 
Table 1.b. NAMA trade weighted averages of bound and MFN AVE tariffs, percent. 
 
 Pre Doha AVE ------------- Post Doha AVE --------------
Bound MFN Bound MFN Bound MFN
 
Developed countries       
EU25 3.1 3.0 1.8 1.7   
Norway 2.8 0.9 1.5 0.5   
Switzerland 4.0 1.9 2.4 1.2   
Other EFTA 12.4 3.1 4.2 2.0   
USA 2.6 2.6 1.5 1.5   
Canada 4.8 2.9 2.7 2.0   
Japan 4.2 1.5 1.9 0.9   
Australia 10.4 4.5 3.9 3.1   
New Zealand 11.8 3.0 4.1 2.7   
 
Developing Countries -- Flexibility -- - No flexibility -
China 6.0 5.8 4.0 4.0 3.5 3.4
India 35.7 26.0 11.7 10.1 10.7 9.1
Brazil 30.1 11.0 10.9 8.3 9.8 7.3
Other Developing Countries 18.1 5.6 7.7 4.1 7.0 3.6
  
Small Vulnerable Economies 30.7 8.4
Paragraph 6 countries 39.5 13.0
Least Developed Countries 43.4 13.2
 
Source: MacMapHS6 database and own calculations. 
 
 
Applied rates based on MFN rates. Table 1b presents trade weighted averages with 
the applied rates based on multilateral MFN rates rather than on bilateral applied 
rates. In effect, the table ignores Free Trade Agreement and preferential tariff rates. 
Also, intra-EU trade is excluded. Generally, applied rates in table 1b are not much 
higher than those in table 1a, suggesting that existing FTAs and preferential rates are 
on average relatively insignificant. This is mainly due to the fact that average MFN 
rates are already fairly low. However, these averages may cover large differences 
from one tariff line to another, and some products may be protected by high import 
tariffs. In such cases, preferences may have considerable impacts not reflected in 
these overall statistics. 
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Table 1.c. NAMA simple averages of bound and MFN AVE tariffs, percent. 
 
 Pre Doha AVE ------------- Post Doha AVE --------------
Bound MFN Bound MFN Bound MFN
 
Developed countries       
EU25 4.3 4.1 2.5 2.4   
Norway 3.9 1.9 2.0 0.9   
Switzerland 6.3 4.2 3.5 2.1   
Other EFTA 12.4 3.1 4.2 2.0   
USA 3.5 3.5 2.0 2.0   
Canada 5.8 4.5 2.9 2.5   
Japan 2.8 2.6 1.6 1.5   
Australia 13.1 5.5 4.5 3.3   
New Zealand 13.1 3.3 4.4 2.8   
 
Developing Countries -- Flexibility -- - No flexibility -
China 9.6 9.5 6.2 6.2 5.3 5.3
India 43.7 30.7 13.5 10.9 12.7 10.3
Brazil 31.0 14.6 11.0 9.8 10.0 9.2
Other Developing Countries 25.9 9.8 9.8 6.5 8.8 5.8
   
Small Vulnerable Economies 39.7 8.6
Paragraph 6 countries 32.6 12.0
Least Developed Countries 45.6 13.6
 
Source: MacMapHS6 database and own calculations. 
 
 
Applied rates based on simple averages. Table 1c provides applied rates analogous to 
those in table 1b but calculated as simple, rather than trade weighted, averages. Since 
these figures are not trade weighted, they are not affected by any trade distortions 
caused by import barriers and they may be interpreted as the average level of protec-
tion provided by import tariffs. In most cases, the simple averages are higher than the 
trade weighted averages reflecting to some extent the distorting effects of the tariffs. 
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AMA scenarios 
In this paper we simulate two NAMA scenarios, scenario 1 modelling reductions in 
applied tariffs allowing for developing country flexibility and scenario 2 modelling an 
alternative reform without the flexibility. The two scenarios are summarised in Box 1 
and described in more detail in the ensuing discussion. 
 
Box 1. Overview of the NAMA trade reform scenarios 
NAMA trade reform scenarios 
 
Least Developing Countries: 
No reduction commitments 
 
Paragraph 6 countries: 
No tariff reductions through the Swiss formula.  
Bind 95 percent of NAMA tariff lines at an average level of max. 28.5 percent 
 
Small Vulnerable Economies 
No tariff reductions through the Swiss formula.  
Bind 95 percent of NAMA tariff lines at an average level of max. 22 percent 
 
Newly Acceded Countries 
Reduction through the Swiss formula with coefficient 15. 
Scenario 1 with 5 percent flexibility and scenario 2 without 
Exceptions for Armenia, Moldova and Kyrgyzstan: Commitments similar to Paragraph 6 countries 
 
Developing countries 
Reduction through the Swiss formula with coefficient 15. 
Scenario 1 with 5 percent flexibility and scenario 2 without 
 
Developed Countries 
Reduction through the Swiss formula with coefficient 10 
Duty free access for all least developed countries 
 
 
 
The general instrument for specifying tariff reduction commitments is the so-called 
simple Swiss formula, defined as  
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where, 
   
t1 = Final bound tariff 
t0 =  Base rate  
a =  Coefficient for developed Members (= 10) 
b =  Coefficient for developing Members subject to the formula (= 15) 
 
The base rate is given as the current bound rate or, in the case of unbound tariff lines, 
the MFN rate plus a constant mark-up of 15 percentage points. The Swiss formula is 
constructed in such a way that the highest tariffs are reduced the most, thus eliminat-
ing tariff peaks. Also, the final bound tariffs will be no higher than the coefficient 
used in the formula, i.e. 15 percent for developing and 10 percent for developed coun-
tries. 
 
The WTO member countries are classified into six groups, each with different bind-
ing and tariff reduction commitments (the country classification is given in table 2): 
 
• Least developed countries or LDCs: LDCs are exempt from making any 
commitments.  
 
• Paragraph 6 countries: Countries with less than 35 percent binding cover-
age are exempt from making tariff reductions through the Swiss formula. 
They are, however, expected to bind 95 percent of non-agricultural tariff 
lines at an average level that does not exceed the overall average of bound 
tariffs for all developing countries after full implementation of current con-
cessions. This level is calculated as 28.5 percent. 
 
• Small vulnerable economies: These countries are exempt from making tariff 
reductions through the Swiss formula, although they must bind 95 percent of 
non-agricultural tariff lines at an average level that does not exceed 22 per-
cent. 
 
• Newly acceded members: These countries make the same reduction com-
mitments as developing countries, except for Armenia, Moldova and the 
Kyrgyz Republic that make the same reductions as paragraph 6 countries. 
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• Developing countries:  These implement the Swiss formula with a coeffi-
cient value of 15.  They do, however, have the flexibility of retaining un-
bound tariffs or formula cut exemptions for up to 5 percent of all lines, as 
long as the lines do not exceed 5 percent of the member’s total import value.  
 
• Developed countries: These countries implement the Swiss formula with a 
coefficient of 10. Developed countries grant duty-free and quota-free market 
access for non-agricultural products originating from LDCs. 
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Table 2. WTO member countries classification in the NAMA negotiations. 
 
------------------------- Countries, with no reduction commitments ----------------------------------- ------------------------- Countries with reduction commitments -------------------------
LDC  
Paragraph 6 countries Countries with less than 
Small, Vulnerable 
Economies
Newly acceded
Members from year 2000
Demanding exceptions
Developing
countries
Developed
countries
 
Angola Cameroon Antigua and Barbuda Albania Argentina Australia
Bangladesh Congo Barbados Armenia Bahrain Canada
Benin Cote d’Ivoire Belize Croatia Brazil Iceland
Burkina Faso Cuba Bolivia F. Yugoslav R. of Macedonia Bulgaria Japan
Burundi Ghana Botswana Georgia Chile Liechtenstein
Cambodia Kenya Brunei Darusalam Jordan Colombia New Zealand
Central African Rep Macao Costa Rica Moldova Korea Norway
Chad Mauritius Congo Republic Oman Hong Kong Switzerland
Congo Nigeria Dominica Taiwan India USA
Dem. Rep. Congo Sri Lanka The Dominican Republic Kyrgyz Republic Indonesia EU25
Djibouti Suriname Ecuador China Israel
Gambia Zimbabwe El Salvador Kuwait
Guinea (Conakry) Fiji Malaysia
Guinea Bissau Gabon Mexico
Haiti Grenada Morocco
Lesotho Guatemala Pakistan
Madagascar Guyana Peru
Malawi Honduras Philippines
Maldives Jamaica Qatar
Mali Mongolia Rumania
Mauritania Namibia Singapore
Mozambique Nicaragua South Africa
Myanmar Panama Egypt
Nepal Papua New Guinea Thailand
Niger Paraguay Tunisia
Rwanda Saint Kitts and Nevis Turkey
Senegal Saint Lucia United Arab Emirates
Sierra Leone Saint Vincent Grenadines Venezuela 
Solomon Isles Swaziland
Tanzania Trinidad and Tobago
Togo  Uruguay  
Uganda    
Zambia 
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Implementing the scenarios  
To implement the NAMA trade reform for our trade policy analysis, we use tariff data 
for the year 2001, obtained from the MAcMap database. This is the same data used in 
the GTAP database and our tariff calculations are therefore directly compatible with 
standard GTAP tariff data.7 The product coverage follows the chairman’s proposal for 
an agreed list of Non-Agricultural products in the HS6 (2002 revision) nomenclature 
(WTO 2006b). 
 
For bound, MFN and applied tariffs, the MAcMap database reports ad valorem tariffs 
and ad valorem equivalents of specific tariffs. Ad valorem tariffs specify a duty as a 
percentage of the trade flow’s value. A specific tariff is expressed as a fixed amount 
per unit of import that has been converted into a value percentage using a unit value 
(the calculation of the ad valorem equivalents was done by CEPII when compiling the 
MacMap database). The total ad valorem equivalent (AVE) tariff applied to a given 
trade flow is thus the corresponding ad valorem and AVE specific tariff added to-
gether. 
 
In order to analyse the economic consequences of the NAMA trade reform, we need 
to calculate how the reform changes applied tariffs. First, we apply the Swiss formula 
to pre-Doha bound ad valorem and AVE specific tariffs separately. The resulting 
post-Doha bound tariffs are compared to pre-Doha applied tariffs. Any applied ad 
valorem or specific tariff, which is higher than the corresponding post-Doha bound 
tariff, is reduced to this new bound level. In effect, we lower the tariff ceiling and cut 
off of all applied rates hitting the ceiling. Finally, we add applied ad valorem and 
AVE specific tariffs to obtain a total post-Doha AVE applied tariff.  
 
This general procedure is subject to a range of exceptions for certain countries as de-
scribed above. We elaborate upon these exceptions in the following. 
 
No reduction commitments 
Recalling that Least Developed Countries are exempt from making any commitments, 
we make no changes to their applied tariffs. Also, as paragraph 6 and small vulnerable 
economies must only bind 95 percent of their tariff lines at an average rate not ex-
ceeding 28.5 percent and 22 percent, respectively, we find that these nations are able 
                                                 
7 In order to avoid a “mis-marriage” of data with our calculated shocks to the data base, we have 
first aggregated the MAcMAP database up to GTAP concordance without making any changes to 
the tariffs. We have then incorporated these tariffs into the initial GTAP data base before we began 
our update and NAMA reduction scenarios. 
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to formulate binding schedules that avoid reductions in applied rates. This is docu-
mented in table 3 showing the simple average of all MFN tariff lines for paragraph 6 
countries and small vulnerable economies. All averages are below 28.5 percent and 
22 percent respectively, implying that the proposed commitments of these countries 
are already satisfied, even with 100 percent binding coverage. We consequently as-
sume that these two groups of countries formulate binding tariff schedules in such a 
way that no reductions in applied tariffs are needed (simply choosing to bind tariffs at 
the MFN level should accomplish this).8 
 
Table 3. The simple average of all NAMA MFN AVE tariffs, percent. 
 Paragraph 6 countries Small Vulnerable Economies
 Average
AVE
Range of 
MFN AVE tariffs
Average
AVE
Range of 
MFN AVE tariffs
tariff Lowest Highest tariff Lowest Highest
 
Armenia 2.2 0.0 10.0 Antigua and Barbuda 9.4 0.0 70.0
Cameroon 16.9 0.0 30.0 Barbados 8.9 0.0 70.0
Cuba 11.0 0.0 30.0 Belize 9.4 0.0 50.0
Côte d'ivoire 11.4 0.0 20.0 Bolivia 9.1 0.0 10.0
Ghana 13.1 0.0 89.2 Botswana 9.3 0.0 45.6
Kenya 18.8 0.0 40.0 Brunei Darussalam 4.4 0.0 1980.6
Kyrgyzstan 7.1 0.0 50.0 Costa rica 5.1 0.0 37.6
Mauritius 22.7 0.0 82.5 Dominica 8.7 0.0 165.0
Moldova 3.3 0.0 15.0 Dominican republic 8.0 0.0 20.0
Nigeria 26.3 2.5 100.0 Ecuador 11.6 0.0 20.0
Sri lanka 8.3 0.0 25.0 El Salvador 6.6 0.0 30.0
Suriname 9.9 0.0 40.0 Gabon 12.1 0.0 30.0
Zimbabwe 18.5 0.0 309.3 Grenada 9.8 0.0 40.0
   Guatemala 6.4 0.0 25.0
   Guyana 9.5 0.0 60.0
   Honduras 5.1 0.0 15.0
   Jamaica 6.0 0.0 40.0
   Namibia 8.7 0.0 45.6
   Nicaragua 3.8 0.0 15.0
   Panama 6.6 0.0 36.3
   Papua new guinea 5.0 0.0 96.1
   Paraguay 12.8 0.0 25.0
   Saint Kitts and Nevis 9.8 0.0 70.0
   Saint Lucia 8.0 0.0 70.0
   Saint Vincent 9.0 0.0 40.0
   Swaziland 8.7 0.0 45.6
   Trinidad and Tobago 8.3 0.0 40.0
     Uruguay 13.7 0.0 23.0
 
Source: MacMapHS6 database and own calculations.  
Note. The simple average of MFN AVE tariff is calculated by first adding the ad valorem tariff and AVE of the 
specific tariff together for each tariff line and then calculating the simple average of all tariff lines at the HS6 
digit level. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Since our trade simulations use applied rates rather than bound or MFN rates directly, we do not 
need to estimate expected post-Doha bound rates for these countries. 
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Note that the fairly low simple averages in some cases cover wide spreads, with some 
tariffs reaching levels in the hundreds and in one case (Brunei) even thousands of per-
cent. 
 
Developing country flexibility rule 
Developing countries are allowed to exempt up to 5 percent of national tariff lines 
from tariff reductions, provided the trade value of those tariff lines does not exceed 5 
percent of total NAMA imports. We implement this flexibility rule assuming that tar-
iff lines with the highest applied rates are the most sensitive and therefore the ones 
chosen for exemption. In cases where multiple tariff lines share the same applied rate 
level, we assume that tariff lines with the highest import value are excluded. How-
ever, this simple rule of implementation entails a choice between slightly underesti-
mating or slightly overestimating the degree of flexibility enjoyed by some develop-
ing countries. This is because for each country a single tariff line is binding; implying 
that all tariff lines with higher applied rates (and trade values in case of ties) obeys the 
two 5 percent criteria and is therefore exempted from reduction commitments. The 
question is whether to include or exclude the single binding tariff line, although in 
most cases it makes little difference. However, for some countries the binding tariff 
line represents a sizable share of imports, implying that one overestimates developing 
country flexibility if the binding tariff line is exempted and underestimates the flexi-
bility if it is not. In the present analyses, we have chosen to exempt the binding tariff 
line whereby we overestimate developing country flexibility slightly.  
 
Table 4 provides each DC’s binding restriction, and data suggests that a few coun-
tries, notably India and Chile, exempt a larger share of imports than allowed by the 
agreement. 
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Table 4. Implementation of flexibility for developing countries: Binding criteria 
emboldened 
 
 --------- Percent of --------- -------- Percent of --------
Country Tariff lines Import value Country  Tariff lines Import value
 
Albania 0.1 5.2 Macedonia 4.1 5.0
Argentina 2.8 5.1 Malaysia 5.0 3.3
Armenia 2.3 5.0 Mexico 5.0 2.4
Bahrain 0.1 5.4 Moldova. Rep.of 5.0 2.7
Brazil 5.0 4.6 Morocco 5.0 4.9
Bulgaria 4.3 5.1 Oman 5.0 0.5
Chile 0.0 11.4 Pakistan 0.9 5.0
China 5.0 2.3 Peru 5.0 2.4
Colombia 1.6 5.0 Philippines 5.0 4.5
Croatia 5.0 4.9 Qatar 0.4 6.1
Egypt 5.0 3.9 Romania 2.5 5.3
Georgia 2.6 5.0 Singapore 0.0 8.2
Hong Kong 0.0 5.2 South Africa 5.0 1.3
India 0.4 13.4 Taiwan 5.0 2.8
Indonesia 2.7 5.4 Thailand 4.5 5.0
Israel 5.0 2.0 Tunisia 5.0 4.9
Jordan 5.0 1.0 Turkey 5.0 1.9
Korea 5.0 2.1 United Arab Emirates 0.0 8.1
Kuwait 0.0 8.8 Venezuela 0.0 5.4
Kyrgyzstan 2.0 6.5
 
Source: MacMapHS6 database and own calculations. 
 
 
The significance of developing country flexibility 
The only difference between the two scenarios presented in this paper is the 5 percent 
flexibility rule. Assuming that the countries apply this flexibility to the most sensitive 
(presumably the most protected) products, this concession is potentially very trade-
distorting. However, the consequences of this distortion are not equally distributed 
among trading nations. To illustrate this point, table 5 shows the share of total NAMA 
exports going to developing countries and the share of total NAMA exports affected 
by the flexibility rule for a number of selected countries (the full list of nations is 
given in table A1 in the appendix A). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
20    FOI    A Global and Danish Perspective 
Table 5. NAMA exports affected by developing country flexibility, percent 
 
 Share of NAMA exports to developing countries Share of NAMA exports facing flexibility
 
Denmark 9.2 0.1
Germany 14.1 0.4
Spain 14.3 0.4
Australia 44.9 1.8
USA 38.3 0.5
China 33.9 1.0
India 32.4 1.1
Argentina 58.7 7.7
Uruguay 60.4 10.5
Malawi 52.2 39.2
Swaziland 73.5 19.3
Kenya 15.7 2.4
 
Source: MacMapHS6 database and own calculations. 
 
 
Although the countries in table 5 are not randomly selected, the figures do illustrate 
the general pattern: A relatively small share of most countries’ exports faces tariffs 
exempted from reduction commitments. However, the few countries that are severely 
hit by the flexibility rule, notably Malawi, Swaziland, Uruguay and Argentina, are all 
developing or least developed countries. In fact, only three of the 10 countries mostly 
affected by flexibility are developed countries.  
 
Calculating shocks to the GTAP model/database 
The resulting NAMA scenario’s shocks to the GTAP model/database are calculated at 
the HS6 digit tariff line level for the 149 WTO members listed in table 2. The 
changed applied tariffs, due to the Swiss formula’s reduction of bound tariffs, are then 
aggregated to GTAP commodity and regional concordance using trade weights (three 
year average of COMTRADE trade values) in order to be able to implement these 
new AVE applied tariffs in the GTAP database/model.  
 
Updating the initial GTAP tariff structure 
The GTAP database version 6 uses 2001 as the base year. A number of important de-
velopments have taken place since then or are planned for the immediate future pre-
ceding implementation of a Doha round. In order not to attribute the effect of such 
developments to the Doha round scenarios analysed in this paper, we update the stan-
dard GTAP tariff structure before simulating the scenarios.9 We have identified five 
of the most important developments as follows: 
                                                 
9 Every update is implemented at the HS6 digit level before aggregation to GTAP concordance. 
  
 A Global and Danish Perspective    FOI   21
1. Final implementation of Uruguay Round commitments 
 For a number of countries, some applied tariffs still exceed the bound tariffs 
in the 2001 tariff data due to the fact that the Uruguay round has not yet been 
fully implemented. We reduce applied tariffs affecting trade flows between 
WTO countries to their bound levels. 
 
2. China’s accession to the WTO 
 The 2001 MacMap data base contains a bound tariff schedule for China even 
 if this has not yet been implemented. We update the applied tariff schedule 
 by reducing, to their bound levels, China’s applied tariffs on trade from WTO 
 members as well as other WTO members’ tariffs faced by China. 
 
3. Abolishment of export quotas on textiles and wearing apparel shipped to 
the EU and the USA. 
 
4. EU enlargement from 15 to 25 members 
 We update the applied, MFN and bound tariffs of the 10 new EU members to 
 give them the same tariff schedules as the rest of the EU. In a similar manner, 
 we adjust non-EU tariffs faced by the new members. Finally, we eliminate all 
 internal tariffs between the new and existing EU members. 
 
5. Implementation of EU’s Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative 
 EU’s EBA initiative has been approved, but not yet implemented. We incor-
 porate the concessions anyway to avoid crediting the Doha round with effects 
 of tariff reductions, which will take place whether or not negotiations are 
 concluded successfully. The EBA is implemented by eliminating all EU tar-
 iffs faced by Least Developed Countries. 
 
Thus we begin by conducting a “pre-simulation” that involves implementing those 
pre-existing WTO commitments and FTAs not implemented as of 2001. We then take 
the resulting data set from that pre-simulation as the base for our NAMA analysis.10 
 
 
                                                 
10 Evaluating the effects of the NAMA reduction commitments in the updated 2001 database is a 
conservative estimate of the economic effect of an agreement. The actual implementation of an 
agreement would take place some time in the future where the world economy and trade volumes 
have increased, thereby also increasing the effects of implementing a NAMA agreement as meas-
ured by the equivalent variation in income. 
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Results 
 
Global effects of reducing NAMA AVE tariffs with and without flexibility. 
The main conclusion from the trade analyses is that the overall economic impact of 
NAMA tariff reductions is rather modest. Global welfare, measured as the EV in in-
come, increases by 9.3 billion US$ in the main scenario with developing country 
flexibility (see table 6)11. Most of the gains are concentrated in a few economic sec-
tors, mainly textiles and wearing apparel, but also chemical, rubber and plastics, mo-
tor vehicles and parts and machinery and other equipment. Asian countries are the 
main winners, while Africa is virtually unaffected as most of the continent is exempt 
from making any reductions under the NAMA reform. The alternative scenario, ana-
lysing the NAMA reform without developing country flexibility, produces a global 
welfare gain of 11.8 billion US$, about 26 percent higher than a NAMA reform with 
developing country flexibility. 
 
Table 6 shows that the NAMA reductions increase global trade by 1.0 percent with, 
and by 1.1 percent without flexibility.  Manufacturing trade increases by 1.3 percent 
with the flexibility rule and by 1.5 percent without. These increases in trade and 
global welfare reflect further reductions in trade barriers that increase efficiency of 
endowments employed in the global economy. 
 
Five sectors stand out in table 6: textiles, wearing apparel, chemical/rubber/plastic 
products (CRP), machinery and equipment not elsewhere classified (M-NEC), and 
motor vehicles and parts (MVP).  The reductions in the AVE tariffs for these five sec-
tors collectively account for 63-64 percent of the NAMA-induced welfare gains, re-
gardless of whether or not the flexibility rule is implemented.   
 
Of the 9.3 billion US$ of NAMA-induced welfare gains with flexibility, about 30 
percent is collectively attributed to increased trade in textiles and wearing apparel, 
while CRP and M-NEC sectors each account for about 11 percent.  The MVP sector 
accounts for over 10 percent of such global gains. 
 
Table 6’s NAMA-induced effects without flexibility have the five stand-out sectors of 
focus take on similar relative patterns of contributions as under the scenario with 
flexibility (excepting motor vehicles and parts discussed below), although flexibility’s 
                                                 
11 For a brief description of the equivalent variation of income concept and the process of compara-
tive static equilibrium in the GTAP model/database, see appendix B. 
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elimination does influence (generally raises) trade volumes of these sectors.  The mo-
tor vehicles and parts or MVP sector is particularly notable in that exclusion of flexi-
bility does change the sector’s standing relative to the other four sectors, as well as 
the volume of sector trade.  In the NAMA scenario without flexibility, the MVP sec-
tor contributes most towards global gains:  over 2.0 billion US$ or over 17 percent of 
the 11.8 billion US$ worth of NAMA-induced welfare gains.  As well, MVP volume 
of world trade rises from NAMA reductions without flexibility by 1.5 percent, up 
substantially from 0.7 percent under the scenario with flexibility.  Compared with the 
setting with flexibility, table 6 shows that eliminating flexibility while implementing 
NAMA reductions increases trade by 0.3 percentage points to 5.9 percent for textiles; 
and by 0.5 percentage points to 7.3 percent for wearing apparel.  The volume of world 
trade of the machinery and equipment sector is hardly influenced by exclusion of 
flexibility. 
 
Table 6. Contributions from reducing AVE tariffs to the Global EV in income and 
percentage change in quantity of trade, by commodity. 
 % change in Contributions to the Global EV in income
 volume of tradea With With No Difference
 With 
Flex.
No Flex Flexibility
index 
Flexibility
Mill. US$
Flexibility 
Mill US$
in value 
Mill. US$
 
Food 0.3 0.4 1.9 179 228 50
Natural Resources 0.3 0.4 2.3 213 506 293
 
Manufacturing 
Textiles 5.6 5.9 15.5 1447 1544 98
Wearing apparel 6.8 7.3 14.4 1345 1563 218
Leather products 4.2 4.6 6.3 584 680 96
Wood products 0.4 0.4 1.3 118 122 4
Paper products, publishing 0.6 0.6 1.2 110 114 4
Petroleum, coal products 0.4 0.4 0.3 26 26 0
Chemical, rubber, plastic prod. 1.2 1.5 11.2 1050 1380 331
Mineral products n.e.c. 1.7 1.8 3.2 301 325 25
Ferrous metals 1.0 1.0 3.0 276 292 16
Metals n.e.c. 1.3 1.3 3.4 319 321 2
Metal products 1.6 1.7 2.9 271 278 7
Motor vehicles’ and parts 0.7 1.5 10.5 977 2038 1061
Transport equipment n.e.c. 0.5 0.6 1.6 149 218 69
Electronic equipment 0.0 0.1 3.3 306 340 35
Machinery & equipment n.e.c. 1.1 1.1 11.3 1051 1071 20
Manufactures n.e.c. 2.5 2.8 6.6 617 739 122
Total Manufactures 1.3 1.5 95.8 8947 11053 2107
 
Services 0.3 0.3 0.0 0 0 0
Total world 1.0 1.1 100.0 9338 11787 2450
 
a The percentage change in volume of global trade includes intra EU trade. 
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Table 7 provides economic impacts of the two NAMA scenarios for 45 countries.  
Welfare gains are not evenly distributed across countries, with a varied mix of coun-
try gainers and losers.  Of the 9.3 billion US$ of NAMA-induced welfare gains with 
flexibility:  Developed WTO member countries account for 1.3 billion US$ or 14 per-
cent, the EU25 accounts for 1.4 billion US$, and Japan benefits by 1.9 billion US$.  
There are important WTO member losers:  the United States loses 2.2 billion US$, 
while Canada’s welfare drops 0.1 billion US$.   
 
Asian countries excluding Japan realize 6.8 billion US$ or 73 percent of the 9.3 bil-
lion US$ of NAMA-induced global welfare gains.  These gains partially arise from 
increased trade in textiles, wearing apparel, and leather goods that collectively ac-
count for 3.8 billion US$ or over half of the 6.8 billion US$ regional Asian gain. 
 
Latin America collectively increases welfare by 1.3 billion US$ that is 14 percent of 
the NAMA-induced global gains under flexibility.  Africa, however, realizes less than 
3 percent of the global NAMA gains, and for two reasons.  First, only four developing 
African countries (Morocco, Egypt, South Africa, and Tunisia) are participating in the 
NAMA program with reductions.  And second, numerous less-developed African 
countries already enjoy pre-NAMA duty-free access to the EU market (e.g., every-
thing but arms) and have exports burdened by preference erosion in EU markets. 
 
Table A2 in the appendix A decomposes welfare effects into allocative efficiency and 
terms of trade changes. The NAMA reductions improve efficiency in almost all re-
gions/countries listed in table 6 with the exception of four regions, EFTA, Russian 
Federation and Middle East, Rest of Former Soviet Union, and Uganda. As increasing 
(decreasing) efficiency translates into higher (lower) domestic production levels, this 
is also reflected in a real GDP growth (decline). 
 
A number of countries/regions lose from the NAMA reform, namely the USA, Cana-
da, Portugal, Poland, Rest of EU, Rest of Europe, the Russian Federation and the 
Middle East and Rest of Former Soviet Union.  
 
The Russian Federation, as a WTO non-member, loses market shares in WTO export 
markets to other WTO member countries, which are gaining relatively better market 
access. The same is true for the aggregate region Middle East and Rest of Former So-
viet Union, where some of the aggregated countries are not members of the WTO. 
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In the United States and Canada, net welfare declines arise from negative terms of 
trade effects having outweighed positive gains from increased efficiency.  For exam-
ple, a US efficiency gain of 1 billion US$ is more than countered by a -3.2 billion 
US$ effect from a fall in the terms of trade.  Under these reductions, the fall in the US 
terms of trade is explained by US export prices having declined as non-NAFTA coun-
tries gain increased NAMA-induced access to North American markets. 
 
There are similar instances of net NAMA-induced welfare declines from negative 
terms of trade effects having dominated positive efficiency gains in Portugal, Poland, 
and the Rest of the EU.   These countries/regions have the NAMA reductions erode 
preferential market access to internal EU/EFTA countries, and these areas export over 
80 percent of their manufacturing goods to the internal EU/EFTA markets.   
 
Looking at the effect on manufacturing production and trade, the analysis shows that 
the volume of manufacturing production will remain unchanged at the global level but 
the volumes of world manufacturing trade will increase by some 1.3 percent.  
 
Notably India will increase its trade with the rest of the world exporting 19.6 percent 
more while importing 27.9 percent more.  Also China, Thailand, Brazil Malawi and 
Madagascar are other notable regions that increase their exports well above the world 
average of 1.3 percent.  
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Table 7. Impacts of the NAMA Reform, by region. 
 
No flexibility -------------- With developing country flexibility -------------
Change in Change in ---Volume of manufacturinga  ----
--- Total Welfare -- Real  GDP Production exports import
Mill US$ Mill US$ % change % change % change % change
 
Australia 373 160 0.1 -0.3 2.7 1.9
New Zealand 33 34 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.5
Rest of Oceania 12 12 0.0 0.1 0.9 0.4
Total Oceania 417 206 - -0.2 2.3 1.6
 
China b 2358 1929 0.1 -0.1 3.7 5.8
Japan 1907 1899 0.0 0.2 1.6 2.3
Korea b 1532 1419 0.1 0.1 1.5 2.3
Taiwan b 836 679 0.1 0.3 1.3 1.5
Indonesia b 352 192 0.0 0.7 1.5 1.1
Malaysia b 574 295 0.1 0.7 1.3 1.6
Thailand b 1228 436 0.2 1.0 3.1 3.8
India b 891 682 0.4 -1.1 19.6 27.9
Rest of Asia b 1219 1174 0.0 0.7 1.5 0.5
Total Asia 10897 8704 - 0.1 2.6 3.4
 
Canada -191 -137 0.0 -0.2 0.2 0.4
USA -2427 -2199 0.0 0.0 1.7 1.0
Mexico b 635 581 0.2 -0.2 1.5 1.7
Brazil b 468 368 0.1 -0.7 4.1 5.2
Rest of America b 381 339 0.0 -0.4 2.1 1.9
Total America -1134 -1047 - -0.1 1.5 1.2
 
Belgium/Luxembourg 138 116 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.6
Denmark 27 30 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.1
Germany 436 277 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.5
Greece 67 20 0.0 -0.1 0.9 0.4
Spain 304 242 0.0 0.1 0.9 0.5
France 217 209 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.3
Ireland 28 38 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1
Italy 365 295 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.7
Netherlands 43 29 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.1
Austria 22 30 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
Portugal -83 -87 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3
Finland 35 49 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4
Sweden 116 129 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.3
United Kingdom 169 181 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.5
Poland -17 -47 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0
Rest of EU -67 -82 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1
European Union 1799 1431 - 0.0 0.4 0.4
 
EFTA 85 130 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.1
Rest of Europe b -13 -49 0.1 -0.3 0.1 0.5
Russian Federation -241 -167 -0.0 -0.2 -0.7 -0.5
M. East and Rest of F. Soviet Union b -261 -123 -0.0 -0.3 -0.5 0.0
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Table 7. Continued 
 
No flexibility -------------- With developing country flexibility -------------
Change in Change in ---Volume of manufacturinga  ----
--- Total Welfare -- Real  GDP Production exports import
Mill US$ Mill US$ % change % change % change % change
 
Malawi 4 3 0.0 0.5 12.6 0.6
Mozambique 2 2 0.0 -0.6 -0.6 0.1
Tanzania 4 3 0.0 -0.2 0.2 0.3
Zambia 2 2 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 0.2
Zimbabwe 5 5 0.0 -0.4 -1.4 0.2
Madagascar 23 23 0.0 4.3 16.6 5.2
Uganda 1 1 -0.0 -1.0 -3.4 0.1
Rest of Africa b 196 214 0.1 -0.8 3.4 3.3
 
Total Africa 238 252 - -0.8 3.3 3.2
 
Total world 11787 9338  - 0.0 1.3 1.3
 
a The result for the manufacturing sectors shown in the table are an aggregation of the 16 manufacturing sec-
tors found in the GTAP data base.  
b Developing countries and aggregated regions where developing countries are included which implement the 
flexibility rule. 
 
 
NAMA-induced effects on welfare without flexibility 
Without the implementation of the flexibility rule, global welfare gains are 26 percent 
(2.5 billion US$) larger than with the rule: 11.8 billion US$ vs. 9.3 billion US$.  The 
developing Asian countries (excluding Japan) account for roughly 90 percent (2.2 bil-
lion US$) of this difference. This larger welfare gain is mainly achieved through a 
further reduction in these countries’ trade- distorting AVE tariffs having increased 
their efficiency gains. The largest efficiency gains arise from further reductions in 
trade-distorting AVE tariffs in the motor vehicles and parts sector where the average 
(trade weighted) AVE tariff rate in this region is reduced from 17.4 to 8.3 percent 
when the flexibility rule is not implemented (table 8). 
 
Not all countries/regions gain from the flexibility rule’s elimination. Thirteen of the 
countries/regions listed in table 7 actually lose slightly in terms of EV in income. This 
arises from adverse terms of trade effects due to the further reduction in trade distort-
ing AVE tariffs by the developing countries. Some countries win while others lose, 
with the final effect on a particular country dependent on whether the country is a net 
importer or exporter of the products affected by the removal of the flexibility rule. 
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Table 8. Change in Asian EV in income and Average AVE import tariffs (exclud-
ing Japan) 
 
EV in income mill. US$ Average AVE import tariff %
 
W. flex N flex Difference
Pre
Doha
Post
W. flex
Post
N flex Difference
 
Food 130 161 31 18.7 18.5 18.4 -0.1
Natural resources 130 347 217 4.7 3.9 3.6 -0.3
 
Textiles 821 819 -2 9.1 6.6 6.5 -0.2
Wearing apparel 2342 2488 146 8.7 5.9 5.2 -0.7
Leather products 660 707 47 3.1 2.4 2.2 -0.1
Wood products 39 37 -2 4.4 3.2 3.1 -0.1
Paper prod., publishing 30 32 2 4.6 3.4 3.4 -0.0
Petroleum, coal, prod. 42 42 0 7.2 6.4 6.4 -0.0
Chemical, rubber, plastic  328 1006 678 7.5 5.3 4.8 -0.5
Mineral products n.e.c. 131 131 0 9.2 6.3 6.0 -0.4
Ferrous metals 127 132 5 5.9 4.2 4.0 -0.3
Metals n.e.c. 201 201 0 6.3 3.6 3.5 -0.1
Metal products 167 175 9 8.6 5.9 5.6 -0.3
Motor vehicles’ & parts 271 1066 795 19.7 17.4 8.3 -9.1
Transport equip. n.e.c. 139 290 150 4.5 3.9 3.6 -0.3
Electronic equipment 287 316 28 0.9 0.7 0.6 -0.1
Machinery & equip. n.e.c. 654 690 37 5.4 3.6 3.6 -0.0
Manufactures n.e.c. 306 349 43 11.8 6.0 5.3 -0.7
Total manufacturing 6545 8481 1936 5.4 3.9 3.4 -0.5
 
Services 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 6805 8989 2184 - - - -
 
 
Effects on Denmark 
This section summarizes the simulated effects of the NAMA scenarios - with and 
without developing country flexibility - on the Danish economy.  We focus on 
changes in Danish exports, imports, domestic production, and finally on overall eco-
nomic welfare.  
 
Effects of NAMA reductions on Danish exports. 
The overall story of the consequences for Danish exports is one of erosion of prefer-
ential access to EU internal markets combined with greater market access in WTO 
members outside the EU. As a member of the EU customs union, Denmark enjoys 
duty-free access to all EU member countries. As the external trade barriers are com-
ing down with the reduction in EU tariffs, non-member countries gain easier access to 
EU markets, thus sharpening the competition faced by Danish companies. At the 
same time, the global tariff reductions increase the access of Danish products to non-
EU markets. As the internal market is by far the most important trade partner for Dan-
ish goods, the preference erosion effect is larger than the market access effect and the 
net change in manufacturing exports is slightly negative (-45 million US$). However, 
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as the expansion in world trade boosts Danish exports of transport services (by 99 
million US$)12, the effect on total Danish exports, including agriculture, natural re-
sources, manufacturing and services, is positive (53 million US$). 
 
Tables 9a and 9b provide effects on Danish exports of NAMA-induced reductions 
with and without flexibility.  Denmark’s 0.1 percent rise in total exports under the 
NAMA reductions with the flexibility rule falls well below the global increase of 1.0 
percent.  With total manufacturing exports falling by 45 million US$, Danish exports 
of services increase by 104 million US$ (0.4 percent), primarily due to a 99 million 
US$ increase in exports of international transportation services. On net, Danish total 
export value increases 53 million US$ under this scenario.   
 
Figure 9a shows that under NAMA reductions with flexibility, Danish trade composi-
tion changes, shifting exports from the EU/EFTA (declining 1.0 percent) towards the 
Rest of the World (ROW) (rising 2.1 percent).  This change in Danish export compo-
sition is nicely exemplified by considering machinery and equipment n.e.c. (M-NEC) 
exports under the NAMA reductions (with flexibility).  Results show: 
 
• Denmark’s global M-NEC exports increase by 0.6 percent or 59 million US$.  
This is a net effect of a 2.5 percent or 101 million US$ increase in new Dan-
ish exports to ROW markets (as average ROW tariffs fall from 4.4 to 3.4 
percent), and a 0.6 percent or 41 million US$ decline in sales to EU/EFTA 
markets. 
 
• The NAMA reductions erode Denmark’s preferential access to the internal 
EU market, by increasing the market access of other WTO members. This 
accounts for table 9a’s declines in Danish M-NEC exports to EU/EFTA mar-
kets. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Please note that the 99 million US$ of expanded exports of transport services do not appear ex-
plicitly in table 9a. They are included under services in the world total column (104 million US$), 
but do not register in the exports of services to the EU/EFTA and Rest of the World sub-totals. The 
reason is that unlike other types of services, international transport services are not exported to any 
particular region in the model. Therefore, it is not possible to decompose exports of total transport 
services into exports bound for EU/EFTA or the Rest of the World. 
  
30    FOI    A Global and Danish Perspective 
Table 9a.  Changes in Danish exports, with flexibility 
EXPORTS to 
Total World ---------- EU plus EFTA ------- --------- Rest of the world .-------
% 
change
Change
Mill.
%
AVE tariff
Change
Mill.
% 
change
%
AVE tariff
Change 
Mill.
% 
change
quantity US$ pre post US$ quantity pre post US$ quantity
 
Food 0.0 -6 1.2 1.2 -18 -0.2 25.1 25.0 12 0.5
Natural resources 0.1 -1 0.0 0.0 3 0.3 0.7 0.7 -4 -1.9
 
Textiles -1.2 -20 0.0 0.0 -36 -3.6 10.0 7.5 16 10.8
Wearing apparel -5.0 -42 0.0 0.0 -50 -6.9 12.4 9.6 8 11.4
Leather products -4.2 -10 0.0 0.0 -11 -5.2 11.7 8.7 0 0.6
Wood products 0.4 5 0.0 0.0 0 0.1 3.7 3.2 6 1.6
Paper prod., publishing -0.1 -1 0.0 0.0 -1 -0.1 6.5 5.9 1 0.4
Petroleum, coal, prod. 0.4 1 0.0 0.0 0 0.1 4.0 3.4 1 1.8
Chemical, rubber, plastic  -0.3 -24 0.0 0.0 -36 -0.7 3.3 2.6 12 0.6
Mineral products n.e.c. -0.4 -3 0.0 0.0 -4 -0.8 5.5 4.2 1 0.4
Ferrous metals 0.4 2 0.0 0.0 -1 -0.1 10.2 8.3 3 3.7
Metals n.e.c. 0.7 3 0.0 0.0 -4 -1.1 9.2 6.1 7 14.4
Metal products 0.6 6 0.0 0.0 -5 -0.5 7.0 5.6 11 4.4
Motor vehicles’ & parts -2.0 -18 0.0 0.0 -14 -1.9 9.2 8.6 -4 -2.2
Transport equip. n.e.c. 1.3 7 0.0 0.0 -6 -1.6 5.1 4.4 13 5.0
Electronic equipment -0.2 -8 0.0 0.0 -16 -0.7 3.9 3.5 8 1.6
Machinery & equip. n.e.c. 0.6 59 0.0 0.0 -41 -0.6 4.4 3.4 101 2.5
Manufactures n.e.c. -0.3 -2 0.0 0.0 -3 -0.7 4.9 4.1 1 0.7
Total manufacturing  -0.0 -45 0.0 0.0 -228 -1.0 4.6 3.7 183 2.1
 
Services a 0.4 104 0.0 0.0 -4 0.0 0.0 0.0 9 0.1
Total 0.1 53 - - -246 -0.5 - - 200 0.9
 
a Services in the world total column (104 million US$) include international transport services, which do not 
register in the exports of services to the EU/EFTA and Rest of the World sub-totals. The reason is that unlike 
other types of services, international transport services are not exported to any particular region in the model. 
Therefore, it is not possible to decompose exports of total transport services into exports bound for EU/EFTA 
or the Rest of the World.  
 
 
Table 9a shows that the NAMA reductions (with flexibility) elicit declines in Danish 
exports to EU and EFTA markets for most of the 16 manufacturing sectors, and a col-
lective decline in manufacturing exports of 228 million US$. Danish declines occur 
from an erosion of Denmark’s preferential access relative to Non-members: that is, 
Non-member exports to EU/EFTA markets rise and crowd-out or divert Denmark’s 
sales.   
 
On the other hand, the NAMA reductions bring increased market access to WTO 
member markets outside of the EU and EFTA, augmenting other Danish manufactur-
ing exports bound for the ROW.  As average ROW tariffs on such Danish exports de-
cline from 4.6 percent to 3.7 percent, Danish exports to the ROW rise for all manufac-
turing sub-sectors except one, motor vehicles and parts (table 9a).   
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Danish exports of motor vehicles and parts or MVP are of particular note, with Dan-
ish exports globally falling 2 percent or 18 million US$, reflecting declines in Danish 
exports to both EU/EFTA and ROW markets in table 9a. Interestingly, Danish exports 
to the ROW fall, despite the NAMA-induced drop in average ROW tariffs on such 
sales from 9.2 to 8.6 percent. NAMA apparently reduces the average ROW tariff on 
MVP exports of Denmark’s competitors from lower pre-NAMA average tariff levels 
and by more. For example (and not documented in table 9a), ROW average tariffs on 
German and Japanese motor vehicle and parts exports are reduced by 1.4 and 1.1 
points from 7.9 percent and 7.3 percent respectively. So Danish exports of motor ve-
hicles and parts are consequently displaced by relatively cheaper imports from other 
countries. 
 
Table 9b shows that implementing NAMA reductions without flexibility manages to 
generate a similar rise in Danish export quantity of 0.1 percent or 50 million US$, 
roughly the same as in the flexibility scenario. However, this similarity covers a lar-
ger increase in the Danish export of services (reflecting a greater expansion in global 
trade) combined with a larger drop in manufacturing exports. Danish manufacturing 
exports to the world fall 0.1 percent or 72 million US$, which is the net effect of a 
236 million US$ decline in Danish manufacturing sales to EU and EFTA markets and 
a partially offsetting rise in sales to Non-member ROW countries of 163 million US$ 
as the average ROW tariffs on trade falls a point from 4.6 to 3.6 percent. 
 
The significance of developing country flexibility for Danish exports is exemplified 
by the MVP sector. Exports to the EU and EFTA are not directly affected by flexibil-
ity. It falls by roughly the same amount in both scenarios (14 million US$) as Danish 
preferential access to these markets erodes. However, the decline in MVP export to 
the rest of the world is almost trebled, from 4 million US$ to 11 million US$, if de-
veloping country flexibility is removed. It may seem surprising that the better market 
access to developing country markets caused by removal of the flexibility rule re-
duces Denmark’s export opportunities. The explanation is that Denmark’s main com-
petitors in those markets, notably Germany and Japan, gain even better market access 
and Danish exporters become more squeezed by the sharpened competition. 
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Table 9b.  Changes in Danish exports, without flexibility. 
EXPORTS to Total World --------- EU plus EFTA -------- ------- Rest of the world -------
% 
change
Change
Mill.
% 
AVE tariff
Change
Mill.
%
change
%
AVE tariff
Change 
Mill.
% 
change
quantity US$ pre post US$ quantity pre post US$ quantity
 
Food 0.1 5 1.2 1.2 -12.8 -0.1 25.1 24.9 17.4 0.6
Natural resources 0.0 -3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.6 -2.9 -1.3
 
Textiles -1.2 21 0.0 0.0 -36 -3.5 10.0 7.4 15 10.3
Wearing apparel -5.1 -43 0.0 0.0 -49 -6.9 12.4 9.3 7 10.3
Leather products -4.1 -10 0.0 0.0 -11 -5.2 11.7 8.5 0 0.8
Wood products 0.4 6 0.0 0.0 0 0.1 3.7 3.1 6 1.6
Paper prod. publishing 0.7 6 0.0 0.0 -2 -0.2 6.5 5.2 7 5.0
Petroleum, coal, prod. 0.3 1 0.0 0.0 0 0.1 4.0 3.4 1 1.5
Chemical, rubber, plastic  -0.4 -35 0.0 0.0 -39 -0.8 3.3 2.6 4 0.2
Mineral products n.e.c. -0.4 -3 0.0 0.0 -4 -0.8 5.5 4.1 1 0.3
Ferrous metals 0.4 2 0.0 0.0 -1 -0.1 10.2 8.3 3 3.5
Metals n.e.c. 0.7 3 0.0 0.0 -4 -1.2 9.2 6.0 7 15.3
Metal products 0.6 7 0.0 0.0 -5 -0.5 7.0 5.5 12 4.7
Motor vehicles’ & parts -2.7 -25 0.0 0.0 -14 -2.0 9.2 8.4 -11 -5.7
Transport equip. n.e.c. 1.0 5 0.0 0.0 -6 -1.8 5.1 4.4 12 4.5
Electronic equipment -0.4 -13 0.0 0.0 19 -0.8 3.9 3.5 6 1.3
Machinery & equip. n.e.c. .5 2 0.0 0.0 -42 -0.6 4.4 3.4 94 2.3
Manufactures n.e.c. -0.5 -4 0.0 0.0 -4 -0.7 4.9 4.1 0 0.0
 
Total manufacturing  -0.1 -72 0.0 0.0 -236 -1.0 4.6 3.6 163 1.9
 
Servicesa 0.5 121 0.0 0.0 -2.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.2 0.1
 
Total 0.1 50 -251 -0.5 188 0.9
 
a The total change in the value of trade with services includes international transportation service which is not 
exported to any specific region in the world.  
 
 
Effects of NAMA reductions on Danish imports. 
The effects of the NAMA reform on Danish imports mirror the changes in exports. 
The sources of Danish manufacturing imports shift from trade partners in the EU and 
EFTA to the rest of the world, as the preferential access to Danish markets enjoyed by 
EU and EFTA members is eroded by reductions in external tariffs. The net increase in 
total Danish imports is smaller than the expansion of Danish exports, producing a 
(small) positive impact on the trade balance. 
 
Tables 10a and 10b provide effects on Danish imports from NAMA reductions with 
and without flexibility.  Table 10a illustrates that the reduction in AVE tariffs on Dan-
ish imports from the NAMA reform (with flexibility) reduces Danish imports from 
EU/EFTA markets and increases imports from ROW markets.  This changing trend in 
Danish import composition is exemplified by Danish wearing apparel imports:  im-
ports from EU/EFTA markets fall 90 million US$; imports from ROW markets rise 
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133 million US$ as Danish import tariffs on such sales decline from 9.8 to 4.8 per-
cent; and on net, Danish imports increase 2.6 percent or 43 million US$ globally.  
Overall, total Danish global imports rise by 34 million US$ or 0.1 percent from aver-
age tariff reductions when NAMA reductions are implemented with flexibility.  This 
net effect arises from a 407 million US$ increase in imports from ROW markets hav-
ing exceeded a 373 million US$ decline in imports from EU/EFTA markets. 
 
Table 10a.  Changes in Danish imports, with flexibility 
IMPORTS from Total World --------- EU plus EFTA -------- ------- Rest of the world -------
% 
change
Change
Mill.
% 
AVE tariff
Change
Mill.
% 
change
%
AVE tariff
Change 
Mill.
% 
change
quantity US$ pre post US$ quantity pre post US$ quantity
  
Food 0.3 14 0.4 0.3 -29 -0.8 7.8 7.1 43 2.8
Natural resources 0.4 3 1.0 0.7 6 0.7 0.6 0.5 -2 -0.6
  
Textiles -1.3 -19 0.0 0.0 -82 -13.5 7.7 4.0 63 9.1
Wearing apparel 2.6 43 0.0 0.0 -90 -19.0 9.8 4.8 133 10.8
Leather products 0.3 1 0.0 0.0 -22 -6.1 6.9 4.2 23 12.5
Wood products -0.1 -2 0.0 0.0 -1 0.0 0.8 0.7 -1 -0.3
Paper prod., publishing -0.1 -1 0.0 0.0 -1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0 -0.5
Petroleum, coal, prod. 0.0 -1 0.0 0.0 -1 0.0 0.4 0.4 0 0.6
Chemical, rubber, plastic  -0.1 -9 0.0 0.0 -33 -0.6 2.5 1.7 23 4.7
Mineral products n.e.c. 0.1 1 0.0 0.0 -5 -0.5 3.1 2.2 6 4.6
Ferrous metals 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 -2 -0.1 0.8 0.7 1 1.1
Metals n.e.c. 0.1 0 0.0 0.0 -1 -0.1 3.2 2.4 1 6.6
Metal products 0.2 2 0.0 0.0 -5 -0.3 2.2 1.6 6 3.4
Motor vehicles’ & parts 0.4 6 0.0 0.0 -44 -2.3 8.0 4.0 50 19.1
Transport equip. n.e.c. 0.0 -1 0.0 0.0 -16 -1.2 1.3 1.0 15 1.6
Electronic equipment 0.1 1 0.0 0.0 -17 -0.4 1.2 0.8 18 2.2
Machinery & equip. n.e.c. 0.1 0 0.0 0.0 -23 -0.3 1.2 0.9 23 2.0
Manufactures n.e.c. 0.1 1 0.0 0.0 -3 -0.5 1.8 1.3 4 1.1
  
Total manufacturing  0.1 22 0.0 0.0 -346 -1.2 3.9 2.2 368 5.2
  
Services 0.0 -5 0.0 0.0 -4 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.5 0.0
  
Total 0.1 34 - - -373 -0.9 - - 407 2.2
 
 
Table 10b provides effects on Danish imports from NAMA reductions without flexi-
bility. Qualitatively, similar trends in effects occur as with the prior simulation with 
flexibility.  Table 10b shows that without flexibility:  Denmark’s imports from tradi-
tional EU/EFTA markets fall 396 million US$, as imports from ROW markets rise 
416 million US$, so as to generate a net gain in global imports of 20 million US$ or 
0.1 percent. 
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Table 10b.  Changes in Danish imports, without flexibility 
IMPORTS from Total World --------- EU plus EFTA -------- ------- Rest of the world -------
% 
change
Change
Mill.
% 
AVE tariff
Change
Mill.
% 
change
%
AVE tariff
Change 
Mill.
% 
change
quantity US$ pre post US$ quantity pre post US$ quantity
  
Food 0.3 15 0.4 0.3 -28 -0.8 7.8 7.1 43 2.8
Natural resources 0.4 3 1.0 0.7 5 0.6 0.6 0.5 -2 -0.4
  
Textiles -1.4 -19 0.0 0.0 -82 -13.6 7.7 4.0 63 9.1
Wearing apparel 2.6 43 0.0 0.0 -90 -19.0 9.8 4.8 133 10.8
Leather products 0.3 1 0.0 0.0 -22 -5.9 6.9 4.2 23 12.1
Wood products -0.1 -2 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.8 0.7 -1 -0.4
Paper prod., publishing 0.0 -1 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 -0.5
Petroleum, coal, prod. 0.0 -1 0.0 0.0 -1 -0.1 0.4 0.4 0 1.1
Chemical, rubber, plastic  -0.1 -12 0.0 0.0 -36 -0.7 2.5 1.7 24 4.9
Mineral products n.e.c. 0.1 1 0.0 0.0 -5 -0.5 3.1 2.2 6 4.7
Ferrous metals 0.0 -1 0.0 0.0 -3 -0.2 0.8 0.7 1 1.2
Metals n.e.c. 0.1 0 0.0 0.0 -1 -0.1 3.2 2.4 1 6.6
Metal products 0.1 1 0.0 0.0 -5 -0.4 2.2 1.6 6 3.5
Motor vehicles’ & parts 0.4 5 0.0 0.0 -49 -2.6 8.0 4.0 54 21.1
Transport equip. n.e.c. 0.0 -2 0.0 0.0 -18 -1.4 1.3 1.0 16 1.8
Electronic equipment 0.0 -1 0.0 0.0 -21 -0.5 1.2 0.8 20 2.5
Machinery & equip. n.e.c. 0.0 -4 0.0 0.0 -28 -0.4 1.2 0.9 24 2.1
Manufactures n.e.c. 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 -4 -0.5 1.8 1.3 4 1.1
  
Total manufacturing  0.1 9 0.0 0.0 -367 -1.3 3.9 2.2 376 5.3
  
Services 0.0 -7 0.0 0.0 -6 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1 0.0
  
Total 0.1 20 - - -396 -0.9 - - 416 2.3
 
 
Abolishing the flexibility rule fails to substantially influence Danish imports:  flexi-
bility’s elimination has total Danish imports decline 14 million US$ from 34 million 
US$ in table 10a to 20 million US$ in table 10b. This reduction arises from a decline 
in Danish manufacturing exports that in turn reduces production, and ultimately 
dampens import demand for intermediate commodities. 
 
Effects of NAMA-induced Tariff reductions on Danish domestic production. 
Table 11 provides the percentage changes in Danish production for total manufactur-
ing and selected subsectors from NAMA-induced reductions in world AVE tariffs. 
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Tabel 11. Change in quantity Danish production, percent. 
 
 Of which contributions from Reductions in
 
 
% change
Quantity of production
AVE tariffs
faced by
Danish
exports
Danish
AVE tariffs
on imports
EU24 
EFTA
Import AVE
Tariffs
All other
AVE tariffs
In the
world
 No flex With flex.
 
Food -0.03 -0.10 -0.38 -0.07 0.00 0.35
Natural Resources -0.08 -0.05 -0.09 -0.01 0.04 0.02
 
Textiles -2.26 -2.22 1.80 3.57 -6.17 -1.42
Wearing apparel -5.90 -5.86 0.95 1.32 -7.02 -1.10
Leather products -3.55 -3.62 2.32 0.38 -3.53 -2.79
Wood products 0.33 0.31 -0.02 0.25 -0.05 0.12
Paper products, publishing 0.08 -0.02 -0.15 -0.03 0.00 0.16
Petroleum, coal products 0.15 0.18 0.13 0.01 0.00 -0.04
Chemical, rubber, plastic prod. -0.37 -0.26 0.44 0.14 -0.20 -0.66
Mineral products n.e.c. -0.15 -0.15 0.18 -0.09 -0.05 -0.19
Ferrous metals 0.26 0.32 0.83 -0.05 -0.06 -0.39
Metals n.e.c. 0.53 0.54 2.00 -0.01 -0.39 -1.06
Metal products 0.04 0.05 0.35 -0.07 -0.02 -0.20
Motor vehicles’ and parts -1.62 -1.27 -0.06 -0.36 -0.65 -0.20
Transport equipment n.e.c. 0.92 1.20 1.41 0.28 -0.11 -0.38
Electronic equipment -0.35 -0.22 -0.36 -0.02 0.03 0.14
Machinery & equipment n.e.c. 0.32 0.38 1.33 0.00 0.24 -1.19
Manufactures n.e.c. -0.23 -0.18 0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.17
 
Total manufacturing products -0.22 -0.17 0.52 0.11 -0.29 -0.51
 
Services 0.04 0.03 -0.08 -0.01 0.04 0.09
 
 
Table 11 shows that NAMA reductions with flexibility decreases total Danish manu-
facturing production by 0.17 percent. The decomposition analysis shows that: 
 
• Reduced world tariffs levied on Danish exports markets outside the 
EU/EFTA region increases manufacturing production by 0.52 percent.  
 
• Reduced Danish import tariffs augment manufacturing production by 0.11 
percent as cheaper intermediate inputs reduce costs and stimulate production. 
 
• The increased market access by Non-member countries to the internal market 
of the EU24 plus EFTA reduces Danish production by 0.29 percent (trade di-
version). 
 
• Not only do the Danish exporters of manufactures gain increased market ac-
cess, so do other WTO member countries. This increased competition on all 
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other markets (excluding the EU and EFTA present in the previous column) 
reduces Danish production of manufactures by 0.51 percent. 
 
• These cumulated effects (0.52 + 0.11 + -0.29 + -0.51) imply a 0.17 percent 
drop in Danish manufacturing production. 
 
Examining effects on table 11’s individual GTAP sectors illuminates other notable 
sector-specific effects on Danish production from NAMA-induced tariff reductions.  
Consider, for example the electronic equipment sector where production declines by 
0.22 percent.  It may seem counter-intuitive that a reduction in AVE tariffs faced by 
Danish exports to non EU/EFTA countries actually reduces Danish electronic equip-
ment production by 0.36 percent. This is because the 0.36 percent reduction in pro-
duction arises from enhanced competition between all industries in the Danish econ-
omy on the domestic labour and capital markets (allocation of endowments). While 
the reduction of the AVE tariff rate faced by the electronic equipment sector is re-
duced by 0.4 percentage points, other industries/sectors are experiencing larger reduc-
tions in AVE tariffs rates on their export markets, so as to pull endowments out of the 
electronic equipment sector, and registering a production decline for the sector.   
 
This inter-sector competition on the domestic endowments also explains the decom-
position of the small increase in services production (0.03 percent).  The service sec-
tor in this NAMA analysis faces no change to its trade barriers. The decomposition 
demonstrates an opposite situation faced by the Danish services sector as faced above 
for total manufacturing:  fall in manufacturing production releases endowments for 
use in the services sector and visa versa.  
 
The reduction in Danish import tariff rates can of course have a negative effect on 
production if it is substituting domestically produced goods in private consumption.  
 
There can also be indirect effects from changes in production and trade patterns of 
other countries, with ultimate effects on Danish production. This could be the case 
where a foreign industry using Danish intermediate products experiences a declin-
ing/expanding production due to the changing AVE tariffs.  
 
In aggregate, the no-flexibility scenario produces a slightly larger decline in manufac-
turing production compared with the with-flexibility scenario (-0.22 versus -0.17 per-
cent). Especially the MVP sector, along with the transport equipment sector, are nega-
tively affected by removing the flexibility concession. In the first case, the decline in 
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production is higher (-1.62 versus -1.27 percent), and in the latter production grows 
by less (0.92 versus 1.20). Sectors positively affected by removal of flexibility in-
clude leather products, wood products and the paper products and publishing sectors. 
 
Welfare impact on Denmark 
The economic impact on at the macro level is minimal for Denmark, gaining 30 mil-
lion US$ per year as measured by the EV in income. 
 
This gain stems form a slight increased allocative efficiency in the Danish economy 
due to the reallocation of endowments between industries resulting in an increase in 
the quantity of real GDP by 0.019 percent and an increase in factor income of 0.004 
percent in the Danish economy even though the terms of trade is slightly negative for 
Denmark. 
 
The improvement in allocative efficiency is a result of reallocation of endowments 
(capital and labour) from sectors characterised by higher levels of economic distor-
tions (such as tariff protection, production subsidies, etc.) to less distorted sectors. 
Endowment reallocations can be deduced from table 11 by looking at changes in pro-
duction. Endowments flow from sectors with declining production to expanding sec-
tors. 
 
The removal of the developing nation flexibility rule virtually has no impact on Dan-
ish welfare, which falls by a negligible 3 million US$. This is not surprising as only 
about 0.1 percent of Danish manufacturing exports are affected by the flexibility rule 
(see table A1 in the appendix). 
 
The smaller welfare gain compared to the scenario with flexibility is caused by a 
smaller improvement in the Danish economy’s allocative efficiency, as the outflow of 
endowments from the agricultural sector is reduced (in table 11, the food sector de-
clines by only 0.03 without flexibility as opposed to 0.10 percent with flexibility). 
This smaller endowment outflow is in turn the result of the slightly larger decline in 
the manufacturing sector (-0.22 percent without flexibility as opposed to -0.17 with 
flexibility) releasing more endowments for alternative use in the agricultural and ser-
vices sector.  
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Qualifications and Concluding Comments 
We find that on average the NAMA reform produces relatively small reductions in 
tariffs. Least developed countries are exempt from making any reductions, and we 
find that many developing countries (the so-called paragraph 6 and small vulnerable 
economies) can implement their NAMA commitments in such a way that reductions 
in applied tariffs are altogether avoided. As for all other countries, with the notable 
exception of India, non-agricultural tariffs are on average already fairly low (single 
digits). 
 
The reduction of NAMA tariffs is found to modestly increase global trade by about 1 
percent and global welfare by just over 9 billion US$ when the developing countries 
use the flexibility rule to exempt up to 5 percent of their tariff lines.  And while trade 
expands for most observed sectors, there is variation in such increases across sectors, 
with particularly high gains realised for the textile and wearing apparel sectors.  A 
number of Asian countries particularly benefit from the NAMA reductions. The abol-
ishment of the flexibility rule is found to increase global welfare by 26 percent to 
nearly 12 billion US$ with Asian countries clearly gaining most from increasing mar-
ket access. 
 
The NAMA tariff reductions with flexibility are expected to generate modest in-
creases in Danish trade: 53 million US$ in exports; 34 million US$ in imports; pro-
ducing a slight improvement in the trade balance of 19 million US$.  The reductions 
are expected to increase Danish welfare by 30 million US$.  Of interest is that the 
NAMA reductions are expected to shift Danish trade patterns from EU and EFTA 
markets towards other world markets.  Readers should note, however, that despite the 
net gains to Denmark from the NAMA reductions, some winner and loser industries 
are expected to emerge.  Danish transport services are likely to benefit while Danish 
exports of motor vehicles and parts may show slight reductions. The removal of the 
developing country flexibility rule has virtually no impact on Danish welfare.  
 
In this paper we focused on illuminating the economic impacts of a possible WTO 
NAMA tariff reductions scenario, with and without the developing country flexibility 
rule.  We note that this study focuses only on the economic impacts of the NAMA tar-
iff reductions, and does not include liberalisation of agricultural and services sector 
barriers implied/proposed by WTO round efforts. Secondly, the model used in this 
analysis is a comparative static one and does not include dynamic gains from in-
creased trade in the analysis. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1.  NAMA export affected by flexibility (full list), percent 
 
Less developed countries 
Share of export 
to Developing
Countries
Share of ex-
ports faced by
flexibility
Share of export 
to Developing 
Countries
Share of 
exports faced 
by flexibility
 
Angola 24.1 0.0 Madagascar 3.6 0.2
Bangladesh 6.3 0.2 Malawi 52.2 39.2
Benin 6.3 0.1 Maldives 10.0 0.3
Burkina Faso 12.2 0.3 Mali 36.8 0.0
Burundi 19.6 0.0 Mauritania 4.2 0.3
Cambodia 9.7 0.5 Mozambique 12.9 0.5
Central African republic 3.2 0.0 Myanmar 45.2 0.5
Chad 4.3 0.0 Nepal 38.4 0.1
Congo 52.0 0.0 Niger 31.7 0.0
Congo (democratic rep.) 1.1 0.0 Rwanda 69.3 0.1
Djibouti 4.7 0.0 Senegal 23.5 0.3
Equatorial guinea 26.3 0.0 Sierra Leone 3.7 0.0
Gambia 11.9 0.6 Solomon islands 63.4 0.0
Guinea 10.7 0.0 Tanzania 11.0 0.5
Guinea-Bissau 32.9 0.0 Togo 21.2 0.0
Haiti 0.3 0.0 Uganda 27.2 0.7
Lesotho 0.3 0.1 Zambia 21.9 1.1
Paragraph 6 Countries 
      
Cameroon 18.7 0.0 Mauritius 5.8 0.3
Cuba 12.7 0.2 Nigeria 23.5 0.0
Côte D'ivoire 7.8 0.0 Sri Lanka 9.7 0.6
Ghana 8.8 0.0 Suriname 3.0 0.0
Kenya 15.7 2.4 Zimbabwe 25.5 0.6
Macau 11.9 0.4
Small, Vulnerable Economies 
 
Antigua and Barbuda 6.2 0.0 Guyana 4.2 0.0
Barbados 3.4 0.0 Honduras 0.7 0.1
Belize 10.0 0.1 Jamaica 3.9 0.0
Bolivia 40.5 0.4 Mongolia 49.9 0.7
Botswana 4.5 0.3 Namibia 24.6 0.1
Brunei Darussalam 37.0 0.0 Nicaragua 3.0 0.3
Costa Rica 13.7 0.1 Panama 29.6 0.7
Dominica 11.1 0.1 Papua new guinea 26.4 0.0
Dominican Republic 1.3 0.1 Paraguay 76.5 0.1
Ecuador 33.4 2.6 Saint Kitts and Nevis 1.0 0.0
El Salvador 2.0 0.2 Saint Lucia 8.0 0.1
Fiji 4.8 0.1 Saint Vincent 4.4 0.0
Gabon 19.2 0.0 Swaziland 73.5 19.3
Grenada 0.8 0.0 Trinidad and Tobago 10.9 0.0
Guatemala 4.2 0.1 Uruguay 60.4 10.5
Newly acceded members from year 2000 
 
Albania 3.1 0.0 Kyrgyzstan 27.0 0.5
Armenia 19.4 0.1 Macedonia 7.9 0.2
China 33.9 1.0 Moldova, Rep.of 10.5 0.2
Croatia 4.3 0.1 Oman 66.3 0.2
Georgia 36.3 0.1 Taiwan 46.7 0.3
Jordan 41.2 1.8 27.0 0.5
  
 A Global and Danish Perspective    FOI   41
Table A1.  Continued  
 
Developing Countries 
     
Share of export 
to Developing 
Countries
Share of ex-
ports faced by
flexibility
Share of export 
to Developing 
Countries
Share of ex-
ports faced by 
flexibility
 
Argentina 58.7 7.7 Mexico 3.4 0.1
Bahrain 42.6 0.6 Morocco 13.8 0.1
Brazil 32.4 1.5 Pakistan 25.5 0.2
Bulgaria 18.7 0.5 Peru 29.1 0.2
Chile 37.0 0.4 Philippines 36.8 0.7
Colombia 23.9 0.7 Qatar 42.3 0.1
Egypt 16.5 0.2 Romania 15.6 1.0
Hong Kong 44.1 1.3 Singapore 53.8 0.7
India 32.4 1.1 South Africa 22.1 0.4
Indonesia 39.1 0.9 Thailand 37.1 1.5
Israel 22.0 0.1 Tunisia 5.2 0.1
Korea 42.4 1.1 Turkey 14.2 1.1
Kuwait 36.6 0.1 United Arab Emirates 37.5 0.1
Malaysia 45.6 0.6 Venezuela 12.8 0.2
Developed 
 
Australia 44.9 1.8 Italy 18.5 0.7
Austria 10.3 0.2 Japan 45.6 1.6
Belgium 14.8 0.2 Latvia 4.2 0.0
Canada 5.4 0.0 Lithuania 4.8 0.1
Cyprus 14.9 0.3 Luxembourg 7.0 0.1
Czech republic 5.8 0.3 Malta 30.5 0.0
Denmark 9.2 0.1 Netherland Antilles 39.5 0.1
Estonia 3.8 0.0 Netherlands 9.6 0.1
Falkland islands 0.8 0.0 New Zealand 25.8 0.5
Faroe islands 0.2 0.0 Norway 5.4 0.1
Finland 16.0 0.0 Poland 5.3 0.2
France 14.5 0.3 Portugal 5.4 0.2
French Polynesia 24.4 0.0 Slovakia 4.3 0.4
Germany 14.1 0.4 Slovenia 12.7 0.6
Gibraltar 8.5 0.1 Spain 14.3 0.4
Greece 29.7 2.3 Sweden 13.3 0.2
Greenland 6.3 0.1 Switzerland 20.7 0.2
Hungary 7.6 0.2 United Kingdom 14.0 0.2
Iceland 3.5 0.9 United States of America 38.3 0.5
Ireland 8.1 0.1 Virgin Islands (British) 11.7 0.2
 
Source: MacMapHS6 database and own calculations. 
Note: Only WTO members are included in the list 
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Table A2.  Welfare effects of NAMA. Equivalent Variation in income decomposi-
tion (Million 2001 US$) 
 
 ------- With Flexibility ------- ---------- No Flexibility ---------
Change ----- of which ------- Change ------ of which -----
In total 
Welfare
Efficiency 
Gains
Terms 
of trade
In total 
Welfare
Efficiency 
Gains
Terms 
of trade
 
Australia 160 245 -85 373 248 125
New Zealand 34 6 28 33 5 27
Rest of Oceania 12 3 9 12 3 9
Total Oceania 206 254 -48 417 256 161
 
China 1929 935 993 2358 1530 828
Japan 1899 581 1317 1907 538 1368
Korea 1419 409 1010 1532 522 1010
Taiwan 679 161 518 836 487 350
Indonesia 192 29 164 352 89 264
Malaysia 295 80 215 574 310 264
Thailand 436 216 219 1228 488 740
India 682 1896 -1214 891 2144 -1252
Rest of Asia 1174 53 1121 1219 104 1116
Total Asia 8704 4361 4343 10897 6210 4687
 
Canada -137 137 -273 -191 129 -320
USA -2199 965 -3164 -2427 945 -3372
Mexico 581 1021 -440 635 1238 -603
Brazil 368 463 -95 468 607 -139
Rest of America 339 325 14 381 410 -29
Total America -1047 2912 -3958 -1134 3329 -4463
 
Belgium/Luxembourg 116 85 31 138 87 51
Denmark 30 30 -1 27 29 -2
Germany 277 283 -5 436 294 142
Greece 20 35 -16 67 41 26
Spain 242 85 157 304 94 210
France 209 212 -3 217 222 -5
Ireland 38 20 19 28 18 10
Italy 295 169 126 365 187 177
Netherlands 29 68 -38 43 73 -30
Austria 30 32 -2 22 32 -9
Portugal -87 2 -89 -83 3 -87
Finland 49 26 23 35 23 12
Sweden 129 44 85 116 45 72
United Kingdom 181 210 -29 169 211 -42
Poland -47 11 -58 -17 14 -31
Rest of EU -82 32 -114 -67 31 -98
European Union 1431 1345 86 1799 1403 396
 
EFTA 130 -3 133 85 -11 96
Rest of Europe -49 50 -99 -13 90 -103
Russian Federation -167 -83 -84 -241 -106 -135
M. East and Rest of Former Soviet Union -123 -64 -59 -261 -46 -215
Malawi 3 1 2 4 1 3
Mozambique 2 0 2 2 0 2
Tanzania 3 1 2 4 1 3
Zambia 2 0 1 2 0 2
Zimbabwe 5 0 5 5 0 4
Madagascar 23 1 22 23 1 22
Uganda 1 0 1 1 0 1
Rest of Africa 214 593 -379 196 692 -496
Total Africa 252 596 -344 238 695 -458
Total world 9338 9368 -31 11787 11821 -34
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Appendix B 
 
The equivalent variation of income concept. 
In this paper, we first provide a brief overview of the GTAP equilibrium displacement 
process from a NAMA-induced change in AVE tariffs, and then provide a broad 
overview of the NAMA scenarios’ effects on global welfare. For both, we use the 
equivalent variation (EV) in income not only to measure changes in global welfare, 
but to identify scenario-induced patterns of gains and losses for individual countries 
or regions.  The EV in income measures annual change in a country’s income (gains 
or losses) from having implemented the NAMA scenarios.  The EV is simply defined 
as the difference between the initial pre-NAMA income and the post-scenario income 
after implementation of NAMA reductions, with all prices set as fixed at current (pre-
NAMA) levels. 
 
EV = Post NAMA Income – pre NAMA Income 
 
The EV is thereby a doubly effective measure for discerning global economic impacts 
of NAMA reform.  First, the EV provides a monetary valuation of effects induced by 
NAMA policy changes globally and at the country or regional level, so as to illumi-
nate winners and losers.  And second, the EV also facilitates comparisons of different 
policy scenarios, given that income changes are measured in initial base prices. 
 
There are two main channels through which the EV in income would be affected by 
reducing trade distortions in different countries around the world. The first is the effi-
ciency gain achieved when a country’s own trade distortions are removed or when it 
interacts favourably with trade shocks abroad. More specifically, the efficiency gains 
are achieved through reallocating resources of production (land, labour, capital) to 
their most efficient use in the global economy. This more efficient reallocation of re-
sources in the economy is driven by the reduction of border protection in each country 
increasing trade and thereby international competition on the domestic market result-
ing in a restructuring of industries and the endowments employed by them.13 Typi-
cally the efficiency effect stemming from global trade liberalization is positive for 
participating countries.  
 
                                                 
13 As the model used in this analysis is a simple comparative static model there are no adjustment 
costs involved in moving the economy from one equilibrium to another. All capital is malleable and 
the wage rate and capital/land rents adjust so that there is no change in the total amount of endow-
ments used in the global economy. 
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The second channel is through a change in a country’s international terms of trade. 
For example, a net exporter of a heavily protected manufacturing commodity would 
expect an increase in its terms of trade when an importing country reduces its border 
restrictions (AVE tariffs) (unless they are currently enjoying duty-free access to pro-
tected markets where domestic prices fall). The importing country would increase its 
volume of imports causing the price of imports to increase.  But, one region’s terms 
of trade gain is another’s terms of trade loss as net importing countries experience  
higher prices due to the increased demand for the manufactured good from the export-
ing country (unless they become sufficient net exports in the course of adjusting to the 
new conditions). Therefore, the terms of trade effect stemming from global trade lib-
eralization is difficult to generalise because (i) if one country is winning another is 
losing and (ii) there are numerous preferential market access arrangements in force 
around the world. 
 
Process of comparative static equilibrium in the GTAP model.  
Initially, the economy is in a pre-shock equilibrium where expenditure equals income, 
and where demand equals supply for each modelled region and globally. By imposing 
a shock on this equilibrium, say with a NAMA-induced change in AVE tariffs, import 
prices change, expenditure and income are no longer equal, and demand and supply 
are dis-equilibrated. Changes in relative prices induce domestic consumers to imme-
diately substitute away from the relatively more costly imports, and towards imports 
that are now cheaper.  The cheaper imports elicit a decline in the composite price of 
intermediate inputs, which in turn generates excess profits at current prices, after 
which output expansion along with associated demand increases for primary factors 
of production ultimately follow.  Now in a state of disequilibrium due to the AVE tar-
iff changes, the GTAP general equilibrium model then moves the global economy 
towards a post-shock equilibrium, where demand again equals supply and expenditure 
again equals income for each country/region and globally under the new regime of 
post-NAMA tariffs.  The model reports the percentage change in production, exports, 
imports consumption, relative prices, etc. that will bring each country/region in the 
global economy back into equilibrium once more. The economy will remain in this 
equilibrium until some other input (for example a change in technology) or a policy 
change shocks the economy out of its new equilibrium state. 
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